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et al.: Congo v. Belgium

ANNEX:
ARREST WARRANT OF 11 APRIL 2000
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO V. BELGIUM)l
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
14 FEBRUARY 2002

SUMMARY OF THE JUDGMENT2

HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND SUBMISSIONS OF THE
PARTIES (PARAS. 1-12)
The Court recalls that on 17 October 2000 the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (hereinafter "the Congo") filed in the Registry of the Court an
Application instituting proceedings against the Kingdom of Belgium
(hereinafter "Belgium") in respect of a dispute concerning an
"international arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian
investigating judge ... against the Minister for Foreign Affairs in office
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia
Ndombasi".
In that Application the Congo contended that Belgium had violated the
"principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of

I.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002
I.C.J. (Feb. 14) available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idecisions.htm.
2.
Press Release 2002l04bis, International Court of Justice, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Feb. 14, 2002 available at http://www.icjcij.orglicjwww/ipresscorn/ipress2002.
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another State", the "principle of sovereign equality among all Members
of the United Nations, as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the
Charter of the United Nations", as well as "the diplomatic immunity of
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State, as recognized by
the jurisprudence of the Court and following from Article 41, paragraph
2, of the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic Relations".
In order to found the Court's jurisdiction the Congo invoked in the
aforementioned Application the fact that "Belgium ha[d) accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court and, in so far as may be required, the
[aforementioned) Application signifie[d] acceptance of that jurisdiction
by the Democratic Republic of the Congo".
The Court further recalls that on the same day, the Congo also filed a
request for the indication of a provisional measure; and that by an Order
of 8 December 2000 the Court, on the one hand, rejected Belgium's
request that the case be removed from the List and, on the other, held that
the circumstances, as they then presented themselves to the Court, were
not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the
Statute to indicate provisional measures. In the same Order, the Court
also held that "it [was] desirable that the issues before the Court should
be determined as soon as possible" and that "it [was] therefore
appropriate to ensure that a decision on the Congo's Application be
reached with all expedition".
By Order of 13 December 2000, the President of the Court, taking
account of the agreement of the Parties as expressed at a meeting held
with their Agents on 8 December 2000, fixed time-limits for the filing of
a Memorial by the Congo and of a Counter-Memorial. by Belgium,
addressing both issues of jurisdiction and admissibility and the merits.
After the pleadings had been filed within the time-limits as subsequently
extended, public hearings were held from 15 to 19 October 2001.
At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented
by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of the Congo,
"In light of the facts and arguments set out during the written and

oral proceedings, the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:
by issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of 11
April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium
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committed a violation in regard to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo of the rule of customary international law concerning
the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of
incumbent foreign ministers; in so doing, it violated the principle
of sovereign equality among States;
a formal finding by the Court of the unlawfulness of that act
constitutes an appropriate form of satisfaction, providing
reparation for the consequent moral injury to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo;
the violations of international law underlying the issue and
international circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000
preclude any State, including Belgium, from executing it;
Belgium shall be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant
of 11 April 2000 and to inform the foreign authorities to whom
the warrant was circulated that Belgium renounces its request for
their co-operation in executing the unlawful warrant."
On behalf of the Government of Belgium,
"For the reasons stated in the Counter-Memorial of Belgium and
in its oral submissions, Belgium requests the Court, as a
preliminary matter, to adjudge and declare that the Court lacks
jurisdiction in this case and/or that the Application by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo against Belgium is
inadmissible.
If, contrary to the submissions of Belgium with regard to the
Court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Application, the
Court concludes that it does have jurisdiction in this case and
that the Application by the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
admissible, Belgium requests the Court to reject the submissions
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the merits of the
case and to dismiss the Application."

BACKGROUND TO THE CASE (PARAS. 13-21)
On 11 April 2000 an investigating judge of the Brussels tribunal de
premiere instance issued "an international arrest warrant in absentia"
against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, charging him, as perpetrator or
co-perpetrator, with offences constituting grave breaches of the Geneva
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Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional Protocols thereto, and with
crimes against humanity. The arrest warrant was circulated
internationally through Interpol.
At the time when the arrest warrant was issued Mr. Yerodia was the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo .
•
The crimes with which Mr. Yerodia was charged were punishable in
Belgium under the Law of 16 June 1993 "concerning the Punishment of
Grave Breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and of Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 Additional Thereto", as
amended by the Law of 19 February 1999 "concerning the Punishment
of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" (hereinafter
referred to as the "Belgian Law").
On 17 October 2000, the Congo instituted proceedings before the
International Court of Justice, requesting the Court "to declare that the
Kingdom of Belgium shall annul the international arrest warrant issued
on 11 April 2000". After the proceedings were instituted, Mr. Yerodia
ceased to hold office as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and subsequently
ceased to hold any ministerial office.
In its Application instituting proceedings, the Congo relied on two
separate legal grounds. First, it claimed that "[t]he universal jurisdiction
that the Belgian State attributes to itself under Article 7 of the Law in
question" constituted a "[v]iolation of the principle that a State may not
exercise its authority on the territory of another State and of the principle
of sovereign equality among all Members of the United Nations".
Secondly, it claimed that "[t]he non-recognition, on the basis of Article 5
... of the Belgian Law, of the immunity of a Minister for Foreign Affairs
in office" constituted a "[v]iolation of the diplomatic immunity of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State". However, the Congo's
Memorial and its final submissions refer only to a violation "in regard to
the . . . Congo of the rule of customary international law concerning the
absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent
foreign ministers".
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OBJECTIONS OF BELGIUM RELATING TO JURISDICTION,
MOOTNESS AND ADMISSffiILITY (PARAS. 22-44)
BELGIUM'S FIRST OBJECTION (PARAS.

23-28)

The Court begins by considering the first objection presented by
Belgium, which reads as follows:
"That, in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no
longer either Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a
minister occupying any other position in the ... Government [of
the Congo], there is no longer a 'legal dispute' between the
Parties within the meaning of this term in the Optional Clause
Declarations of the Parties and that the Court accordingly lacks
jurisdiction in this case."
The Court recalls that, according to its settled jurisprudence, its
jurisdiction must be determined at the time that the act instituting
proceedings was ftled. Thus, if the Court has jurisdiction on the date the
case is referred to it, it continues to do so regardless of subsequent
events. Such events might lead to a finding that an application has
subsequently become moot and to a decision not to proceed to judgment
on the merits, but they cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
The Court then finds that, on the date that the Congo's Application
instituting these proceedings was ftled, each of the Parties was bound by
a declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, ftled in
accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court:
Belgium by a declaration of 17 June 1958 and the Congo by a
declaration of 8 February 1989. Those declarations contained no
reservation applicable to the present case. The Court further observes
that it is, moreover, not contested by the Parties that at the material time
there was a legal dispute between them concerning the international
lawfulness of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and the consequences
to be drawn if the warrant was unlawful. The Court accordingly
concludes that at the time that it was seised of the case it had jurisdiction
to deal with it, and that it still has such jurisdiction, and that Belgium's
first objection must therefore be rejected.
BELGIUM'S SECOND OBJECTION (PARAS.

29-32)

The second objection presented by Belgium is the following:
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"That in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no
longer either Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a
minister occupying any other position in the ... Government [of
the Congo], the case is now without object and the Court should
accordingly decline to proceed to judgment on the merits of the
case."
The Court notes that it has already affIrmed on a number of occasions
that events occurring subsequent to the filing of an application may
render the application without object such that the Court is not called
upon to give a decision thereon. However, the Court considers that this is
not such a case. It fInds that the change which has occurred in the
situation of Mr. Yerodia has not in fact put an end to the dispute between
the Parties and has not deprived the Application of its object. The Congo
argues that the arrest warrant issued by the Belgian judicial authorities
against Mr. Yerodia was and remains unlawful. It asks the Court to hold
that the warrant is unlawful, thus providing redress for the moral injury
which the warrant allegedly caused to it. The Congo also continues to
seek the cancellation of the warrant. For its part, Belgium contends that it
did not act in violation of international law and it disputes the Congo's
submissions. In the view of the Court, it follows from the foregoing that
the Application of the Congo is not now without object and that
accordingly the case is not moot. Belgium's second objection is
accordingly rejected.
BELGIUM'S THIRD OBJECTION (PARAS.

33-36)

The third Belgian objection is put as follows:
"That the case as it now stands is materially different to that set
out in the [Congo]'s Application instituting proceedings and that
the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case and/or that
the application is inadmissible."
The Court notes that, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, it
"cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought before it by application to
be transformed by amendments in the submissions into another dispute
which is different in character". However, the Court considers that in the
present case the facts underlying the Application have not changed in a
way that produced such a transformation in the dispute brought before it.
The question submitted to the Court for decision remains whether the
issue and circulation of the arrest warrant by the Belgian judicial
authorities against a person who was at that time the Minister for Foreign
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Affairs of the Congo were contrary to international law. The Congo's
final submissions arise "directly out of the question which is the subjectmatter of that Application". In these circumstances, the Court considers
that Belgium cannot validly maintain that the dispute brought before the
Court was transformed in a way that affected its ability to prepare its
defence, or that the requirements of the sound administration of justice
were infringed. Belgium's third objection is accordingly rejected.
BELGIUM'S FOURTH OBJECTION (PARAS. 37-40)

The fourth Belgian objection reads as follows:
"That, in the light of the new circumstances concerning Mr.
Yerodia Ndombasi, the case has assumed the character of an
action of diplomatic protection but one in which the individual
being protected has failed to exhaust local remedies, and that the
Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case and/or that the
application is inadmissible."
The Court notes that the Congo has never sought to invoke before it Mr.
Yerodia's personal rights. It considers that, despite the change in
professional situation of Mr. Yerodia, the character of the dispute
submitted to the Court by means of the Application has not changed: the
dispute still concerns the lawfulness of the arrest warrant issued on 11
April 2000 against a person who was at the time Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Congo, and the question whether the rights of the Congo
have or have not been violated by that warrant. The Court finds that, as
the Congo is not acting in the context of protection of one of its
nationals, Belgium cannot rely upon the rules relating to the exhaustion
of local remedies.
In any event, the Court recalls that an objection based on non-exhaustion
of local remedies relates to the admissibility of the application. Under
settled jurisprudence, the critical date for determining the admissibility of
an application is the date on which it is filed. Belgium accepts that, on
the date on which the Congo filed the Application instituting
proceedings, the Congo had a direct legal interest in the matter, and was
asserting a claim in its own name. Belgium's fourth objection is
accordingly rejected.
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BELGIUM'S SUBSIDIARY ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE NON ULTRA
PETITA RULE (PARAS. 41-43)

As a subsidiary argument, Belgium further contends that "[i]n the event
that the Court decides that it does have jurisdiction in this case and that
the application is admissible, ... the non ultra petita rule operates to limit
the jurisdiction of the Court to those issues that are the subject of the
[Congo]' s final submissions".
Belgium points out that the Congo initially advanced a twofold
argument, based, on the one hand, on the Belgian judge's lack of
jurisdiction and, on the other, on the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed
by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. According to Belgium, the Congo
now confines itself to arguing the latter point, and the Court
consequently cannot rule on the issue of universal jurisdiction in any
decision it renders on the merits of the case.
The Court recalls the well-established principle that "it is the duty of the
Court not only to reply to the questions as stated in the final submissions
of the parties, but also to abstain from deciding points not included in
those submissions" The Court observes that, while it is thus not entitled
to decide upon questions not asked of it, the non ultra petita rule
nonetheless cannot preclude the Court from addressing certain legal
points in its reasoning. Thus in the present case the Court may not rule,
in the operative part of its Judgment, on the question whether the
disputed arrest warrant, issued by the Belgian investigating judge in
exercise of his purported universal jurisdiction, complied in that regard
with the rules and principles of international law governing the
jurisdiction of national courts. This does not mean, however, that the
Court may not deal with certain aspects of that question in the reasoning
of its Judgment, should it deem this necessary or desirable.
MERITS OF THE CASE (PARAS. 45-71)

As indicated above, in its Application instituting these proceedings, the
Congo originally challenged the legality of the arrest warrant of 11 April
2000 on two separate grounds: on the one hand, Belgium's claim to
exercise a universal jurisdiction and, on the other, the alleged violation of
the immunities of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo then in
office. However, in its submissions in its Memorial, and in its final
submissions at the close of the oral proceedings, the Congo invokes only
the latter ground.
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The Court observes that, as a matter of logic, the second ground should
be addressed only once there has been a determination in respect of the
first, since it is only where a State has jurisdiction under international
law in relation to a particular matter that there can be any question of
immunities in regard to the exercise of that jurisdiction. However, in the
present case, and in view of the final form of the Congo's submissions,
the Court first addresses the question whether, assuming that it had
jurisdiction under international law to issue and circulate the arrest
warrant of 11 April 2000, Belgium in so doing violated the immunities of
the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo ..
IMMUNITY AND INVIOLABILITY OF AN INCUMBENT FOREIGN MINISTER
IN GENERAL (PARAS. 47-55)

The Court observes at the outset that in international law it is firmly
established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents,· certain holders
of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of
Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from
jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal. For the purposes of
the present case, it is only the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs that fall for
the Court to consider.
The Court notes that a certain number of treaty instruments were cited by
the Parties in this regard, including the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961 and the New York Convention on
Special Missions of 8 December 1969. The Court finds that these
conventions provide useful guidance on certain aspects of the question of
immunities, but that they do not contain any provision specifically
defining the immunities enjoyed by Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It is
consequently on the basis of customary international law that the Court
must decide the questions relating to the immunities of such Ministers
raised in the present case.
In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for

Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure
the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective
States. In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court
must therefore first consider the nature of the functions exercised by a
Minister for Foreign Affairs. After an examination of those functions, the
Court concludes that they are such that, throughout the duration of his or
her office, a Minister for Foreign Affairs when abroad enjoys full
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity
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and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of
authority of another State which would hinder him or her, in the
performance of his or her duties.
The Court finds that in this respect no distinction can be drawn between
acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official" capacity
and those claimed to have been performed in a "private capacity", or, for
that matter, between acts performed before the person concerned
assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed
during the period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreign Affairs is
arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is clearly thereby
prevented from exercising the functions of his or her office. Furthermore,
even the mere risk that, by travelling to or transiting another State, a
Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or herself to legal
proceedings could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when
required to do so for the purposes of the performance of his or her
official functions.
The Court then addresses Belgium's argument that immunities accorded
to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs can in no case protect them
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity.
The Court states that it has carefully examined State practice, including
national legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts,
such as the House of Lords in the United Kingdom or the French Court
of Cassation, and that it has been unable to deduce from this practice that
there exists under customary international law any form of exception to
the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability
to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of
having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Court
adds that it has also examined the rules concerning the immunity or
criminal responsibility of persons having an official capacity contained
in the legal instruments creating international criminal tribunals, and
which are specifically applicable to the latter (see Charter of the
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Art. 7; Charter of the
International Military Tribunal of Tokyo, Art. 6; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para.
2; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6,
para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 27), and that it
finds that these rules likewise do not enable it to conclude that any such
exception exists in customary international law in regard to national
courts. Finally, the Court observes that none of the decisions of the
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Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals, or of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, cited by
Belgium deal with the question of the immunities of incumbent Ministers
for Foreign Affairs before national courts where they are accused of
having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Court
accordingly notes that those decisions are in no way at variance with the
findings it has reached above. The Court accordingly does not accept
Belgium's argument in this regard.
It further notes that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts
must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional
immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, while
absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although various
international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain
serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition,
thereby requiring them to extend their criminal jurisdiction, such
extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary
international law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The
Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed
by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they
enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed,
irrespective of their gravity. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot
exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.
Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an
incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar
to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. The Court refers to
circumstances where such persons are tried in their own countries, where
the State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that
immunity, where such persons no longer enjoy all of the immunities
accorded by international law in other States after ceasing to hold the
office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and where such persons are
subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal
courts, where they have jurisdiction.
THE ISSUE AND CIRCULATION OF THE ARREST WARRANT OF
2000 (PARAS. 62-71)

11

APRIL

Given the conclusions it has reached above concerning the nature and
scope of the rules governing the immunity from criminal jurisdiction
enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Court then
considers whether in the present case the issue of the arrest warrant of 11
April 2000 and its international circulation violated those rules. The
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Court recalls in this regard that the Congo requests it, in its first final
submission, to adjudge and declare that:
B]y issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi,
Belgium committed a violation in regard to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo of the rule of customary international law
concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from
criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers; in so doing, it
violated the principle of sovereign equality among States."
After examining the terms of the arrest warrant, the Court notes that its
issuance, as such, represents an act by the Belgian judicial authorities
intended to enable the arrest on Belgian territory of an incumbent
Minister for Foreign Affairs on charges of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. The fact that the warrant is enforceable is clearly apparent
from the order given in it to "all bailiffs and agents of public authority ...
to execute this arrest warrant" and from the assertion in the warrant that
"the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs currently held by the
accused does not entail immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement".
The Court notes that the warrant did admittedly make an exception for
the case of an official visit by Mr. Yerodia to Belgium, and that Mr.
Yerodia never suffered arrest in Belgium. The Court considers itself
bound, however, to find that, given the nature and purpose of the
warrant, its mere issue violated the immunity which Mr. Yerodia enjoyed
as the Congo's incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court
accordingly concludes that the issue of the warrant constituted a violation
of an obligation of Belgium towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect
the immunity of that Minister and, more particularly, infringed the
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by
him under international law.
The Court also notes that Belgium admits that the purpose of the
international circulation of the disputed arrest warrant was "to establish a
legal basis for the arrest of Mr. Yerodia ... abroad and his subsequent
extradition to Belgium". The Court finds that, as in the case of the
warrant's issue, its international circulation from June 2000 by the
Belgian authorities, given its nature and purpose, effectively infringed
Mr. Yerodia's immunity as the Congo's incumbent Minister for Foreign
Affairs and was furthermore liable to affect the Congo's conduct of its
international relations. The Court concludes that the circulation of the
warrant, whether or not it significantly interfered with Mr. Yerodia's
diplomatic activity, constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium
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towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of the
incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more
particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability then enjoyed by him under international law.
REMEDIES (PARAS. 72-77)
The Court then addresses the issue of the remedies sought by the Congo
on account of Belgium's violation of the above-mentioned rules of
international law. (Cf the second, third and fourth submissions of the
Congo reproduced above).
The Court observes that it has already concluded that the issue and
circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 by the Belgian
authorities failed to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly, infringed the
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by
Mr. Yerodia under international law. Those acts engaged Belgium's
international responsibility. The Court considers that the findings so
reached by it constitute a form of satisfaction which will make good the
moral injury complained of by the Congo.
However, the Court goes on to observe that, as the Permanent Court of
International Justice stated in its Judgment of 13 September 1928 in the
case concerning the Factory at Chorz6w:
"[t]he essential principle contained in the actual notion of an
illegal act % a principle which seems to be established by
international practice and in particular by the decisions of
arbitral tribunals % is that reparation must, as far as possible,
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
act had not been committed" (P.C.U., Series A, No. 17, p. 47).
The Court finds that, in the present case, "the situation which would, in
all probability, have existed if [the illegal act] had not been committed"
cannot be re-established merely by a finding by the Court that the arrest
warrant was unlawful under international law. The warrant is still extant,
and remains unlawful, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Yerodia has
ceased to be Minister for Foreign Mfairs. The Court accordingly
considers that Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the
warrant in question and so inform the authorities to whom it was
circulated.
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The Court sees no need for any further remedy: in particular, the Court
points out that it cannot, in a judgment ruling on a dispute between the
Congo and Belgium, indicate what that judgment's implications might be
for third States, and the Court finds that it cannot therefore accept the
Congo's submissions on this point.
The full text of the operative paragraph (para. 78) reads as follows:
"For these reasons,
The Court,
(1) (A) By fifteen votes to one,
Rejects the objections of the Kingdom of Belgium relating to
jurisdiction, mootness and admissibility;
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shhi; Judges
Ranjeva,
Herczegh,
Fleischhauer,
Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek, AI-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc
Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert;
Against: Judge Oda;
(B) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by
the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 17 October 2000;
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges
Ranjeva,
Herczegh,
Fleischhauer,
Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek, AI-Khasawneh, Buergentha1; Judges ad hoc
Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert;
Against: Judge Oda;
(C) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is not without object and that accordingly the case is not
moot;
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For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges
Ranjeva,
Herczegh,
Fleischhauer,
Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek, AI-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc
Bula-Bula, Vanden Wyngaert;
Against: Judge Oda;
(D) By fifteen votes to one,
Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is admissible;
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges
Ranjeva,
Herczegh,
Fleischhauer,
Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek, AI-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc
Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert;
Against: Judge Oda;
(2) By thirteen votes to three,
Finds that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of
the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, and its international
circulation, constituted violations of a legal obligation of the
Kingdom of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, in that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
enjoyed under international law;
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges
Ranjeva,
Herczegh,
Fleischhauer,
Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek, Buergenthal; Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula;
Against: Judges Oda, Al-Khasawneh; Judge ad hoc
Van den Wyngaert;
(3) By ten votes to six,
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Finds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own
choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so
inform the authorities to whom that warrant was circulated;
For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges
Ranjeva,
Herczegh,
Fleischhauer,
Koroma,
Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek; Judge ad hoc
Bula-Bula;
Against: Judges Oda, Higgins, Kooijmans, AIKhasawneh, Buergenthal; Judge ad hoc Van den
Wyngaert."
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE GUILLAUME, PRESIDENT

In his separate opinion, President Guillaume subscribes to the Judgment

of the Court and sets out his position on one question which the
Judgment had not addressed: whether the Belgian judge has jurisdiction'
to issue an international arrest warrant against Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi.
He recalls that the primary aim of the criminal law is to enable
punishment in each country of offences committed in the national
territory. He adds that classic international law does not exclude a State's
power in some cases to exercise its judicial jurisdiction over offences
committed abroad, but he emphasizes that the exercise of that
jurisdiction is not without its limits, as the Permanent Court stated in the
"Lotus" case as long ago as 1927.
He continues by making it clear that, under the law as classically
formulated, a State normally has jurisdiction over an offence committed
abroad only if the offender, or at the very least the victim, has the
nationality of that State, or if the crime threatens its internal or external
security.
Additionally, States may exercise jurisdiction in cases of piracy and in
the situation of subsidiary universal jurisdiction provided for by various
conventions if the offender is present on their territory. However, apart
from these cases, international law does not accept universal jurisdiction;
still less does it accept universal jurisdiction in absentia.
Thus, President Guillaume concludes that, if the Court had addressed
these questions, it ought to have found that the Belgian judge was wrong
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in holding himself competent to prosecute Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi by
relying on a universal jurisdiction incompatible with international law.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ODA

Judge Oda voted against all of the provisions of the operative part of the
Court's Judgment in this case. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Oda
stresses that the Court should have declared ex officio that it lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the Congo's Application of 17 October 2000
because there was at the time no legal dispute between the Parties of the
kind required under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute. In his
dissenting opinion, Judge Oda reiterates the arguments he made in his
declaration appended to the Court's Order of 8 December 2000
concerning the request for indication of preliminary measures, and he
addresses four main points.
First, Judge Oda stresses that a belief by the Congo that the 1993 Belgian
Law violated international law is not enough to create a legal dispute
between the Parties. In its Application, the Congo asserted that
Belgium's 1993 Law, as amended in 1999, concerning the Punishment of
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law ("the 1993
Belgian Law"), contravenes international law. The Congo also argued
that Belgium's prosecution of Mr. Yerodia, Foreign Minister of the
Congo, violated the diplomatic immunity granted under international law
to Ministers for Foreign Affairs. This argument was not supported by
proof that Mr. Yerodia himself had suffered or would suffer anything
more than some moral injury. Because of this, the case did not concern a
legal dispute, but instead amounted to a request from the Congo for the
Court to render a legal opinion on the lawfulness of the 1993 Belgian
Law and actions taken under it. Judge Oda expresses grave concern that
the Court's finding that there was a legal dispute could lead to an
excessive number of cases being referred to the Court without any real
injury being evidenced, a state of affairs which could cause States to
withdraw their acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
Second, Judge Oda believes that the Congo changed the subject-matter
of the proceedings between the time it filed its Application of 17 October
2000 and submitted its Memorial on 15 May 2001. The questions the
Congo originally raised whether a State has extraterritorial
jurisdiction over crimes amounting to serious violations of humanitarian
law regardless of where they were committed and by whom, and whether
a Foreign Minister is exempt from such jurisdiction - were transformed
into questions concerning the issuance and international circulation of an
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arrest warrant against a Foreign Minister and the immunities of
incumbent Foreign Ministers. This transformation of the basic issues of
the case, Judge Oda believes, did not come within the scope of the right
the Congo reserved in its Application "to argue further the grounds of its
Application". Judge Oda agrees with the Court's determination that the
alleged dispute (which he does not agree was a legal dispute), was the
one existing in October 2000, and he believes, therefore, that the Court
was correct to reject Belgium's objections relating to "jurisdiction,
mootness and admissibility".
Third, Judge Oda turns to the question of whether the present case
involves any legal issues on which the Congo and Belgium hold
conflicting views. In response, he notes that the Congo appears to have
abandoned its assertion, made in its Application, that the 1993 Belgian
Law was itself contrary to the principle of sovereign equality under
international law. In this regard, Judge Oda finds that extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction has been expanded in recent decades, and that
universal jurisdiction is being increasingly recognized. Judge Oda
believes that the Court wisely refrained from finding on this issue, since
the law is not sufficiently developed in this area, and because the Court
was not requested to take a decision on this point. Judge Oda also
stresses his belief that the issuance and circulation of an arrest warrant,
without any action concerning the warrant by third States, does not have
any legal impact. Regarding diplomatic immunity, Judge Oda divides the
question presented by this case into two main issues: first, whether in
principle a Foreign Minister is entitled to the same immunity as
diplomatic agents; and second, whether diplomatic immunity can be
claimed in respect of serious breaches of humanitarian law. The Court,
he indicates, has not sufficiently answered these questions, and should
not have made the broad finding it appears to make, according Ministers
for Foreign Affairs absolute immunity.
Finally, Judge Oda believes that there is no practical significance to the
Court's order that Belgium cancel the arrest warrant of April 2000, since
Belgium can presumably issue a new arrest warrant against Mr. Yerodia
as a former Minister for Foreign Affairs. If the Court believes that the
sovereign dignity of the Congo was violated in 2000, the harm done
cannot be remedied by the cancellation of the arrest warrant; the only
remedy would be an apology by Belgium. For his part, Judge Oda does
not believe that the Congo suffered any injury, since no action was ever
taken against Mr. Yerodia pursuant to the warrant. In closing, Judge ada
states that he finds the case "not only unripe for adjudication at this time
but also fundamentally inappropriate for the Court's consideration".
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DECLARAnON OF JUDGE RANJEV A

In his declaration, Judge Ranjeva expresses agreement with both the
operative part and the Court's approach in refraining from consideration
of the issue of the merit of the extremely broad interpretation given to
universal jurisdiction in absentia by the organs of the Belgian State. The
withdrawal of the Congo's original first submission from its final
submissions resulted in excluding universal jurisdiction from the scope
of the claims. This change in the Applicant's litigation strategy obscured
the heart of the problem underlying the present case as seen in the light
of evolving opinion and international law concerning the suppression of
the most heinous international crimes. The author points out that
customary international law, as codified by the law of the sea
conventions, recognizes one situation in which universal jurisdiction may
be exercised: maritime piracy. The development of conventional law is
marked by the gradual establishment of national courts' jurisdiction to
punish, progressing as it has from the affmnation of the obligation to
prevent and punish, without however establishing jurisdiction to punish,
towards the enshrinement in treaty-made law of the principle aut judicare
aut dedere. Judge Ranjeva finds Belgium's interpretation of the "Lotus"
case, which in its view lays down the principle that jurisdiction exists in
the absence of an explicit prohibition, to be unreasonable given the facts
and circumstances of the case on which the Permanent Court of
International Justice was called to adjudicate. Judge Ranjeva is of the
opinion that, leaving aside the compelling obligation to give effect to the
punishment and prevention called for by international law and without it
being necessary to condemn the Belgian Law, it would have been
difficult under current positive law not to uphold the Congo's original
first submission.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KOROMA

In his separate opinion, Judge Koroma stated that the choice of technique
or method of responding to the final submissions put to the Court by the
Parties is the prerogative of the Court so long as the Judgment provides a
complete answer to the submissions. On the other hand, in the context of
the present case, the Court decided not to engage in a legal discourse or
exegesis to reach its conclusion, since it did not consider it necessary,
interesting though it may have been. The Judgment cannot therefore be
juridically queried on this ground.
Judge Koroma maintained that the Court was entitled, in responding to
submissions, to take as its point of departure the determination of
whether international law permits an exemption of immunity from the
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jurisdiction of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs without delving
into the issue of universal jurisdiction, particularly as both Parties had
relinquished "the issue and had asked the Court to pronounce on it only in
so far as it relates to the question of the immunity of a Foreign Minister
in office. Thus, in his view, and despite appearances to the contrary, what
the Court is called upon to decide is not which of the principles of either
immunity or universal jurisdiction is pre-eminent, but rather whether the
issue and circulation of the warrant violated the immunity of a Foreign
Minister in office. Judge Koroma pointed out that jurisdiction and
immunity are different concepts.
According to him, the method chosen by the Court is also justified on
practical grounds; in that the arrest warrant had been issued in Belgium
on the basis of Belgian law, it was therefore appropriate for the Court to
determine the impact of that law on an incumbent Foreign Minister. The
Court has ruled that while Belgium is entitled to initiate criminal
proceedings against anyone in its jurisdiction, this did not extend to an
incumbent Foreign Minister of a foreign State who is immune from such
jurisdiction. In the Judge's opinion, the Judgment should be seen as
responding to that issue, the paramount legal justification for which is
that a Foreign Minister's immunity is not only of functional necessity but
increasingly nowadays he or she represents the State, even though this
position is not assimilable to that of Head of State. However, in the
Judge's view, the Judgment should not be considered either as a
validation or a rejection of the principle of universal jurisdiction,
particularly when no such submission was before the Court.
On the other hand, the Judge stated that, by issuing and circulating the
warrant, Belgium had demonstrated how seriously it took its
international obligation to combat international crimes, yet it is
unfortunate that the wrong case would appear to have been chosen to do
this. It is his opinion that today, together with piracy, universal
jurisdiction is available for certain crimes" such as war crimes, crimes
against humanity including the slave trade and genocide.
Finally, on the issue of remedies, Judge Koroma considered that the
Court's instruction to Belgium to cancel the arrest warrant should repair
the moral injury suffered by the Congo and restore the situation status
quo ante before the warrant was issued and circulated. This should
restore legal peace between the Parties.
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JOINT SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGES HIGGINS, KOOIJMANS AND
BUERGENTHAL

In their joint separate opinion, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal agree with the Court's holding on jurisdiction and
admissibility, and with much of what the Court has to say regarding
immunities of incumbent Foreign Ministers. They consider, however,
that the Court should also have addressed the issue of universal
jurisdiction since the issue of immunities depends, conceptually, upon a
pre-existing jurisdiction. The ultra petita rule bars only a ruling on
universal jurisdiction in the dispositif, not its elucidation. Such
elucidation was necessary because immunities and universal jurisdiction
are closely interrelated in this case and bear on the maintenance of
stability in international relations without perpetuating impunity for
international crimes.
Turning to universal jurisdiction, Judges Higgins, Kooijrnans and
Buergenthal ask whether States are entitled to exercise such jurisdiction
over persons accused of serious international crimes who have no
connection with the forum State and are not present in the State's
territory. Although they find no established practice indicating the
exercise of such jurisdiction, neither do they find evidence of an opinio
juris that deems it illegal. Moreover, the growing number of multilateral
treaties for the punishment of serious international crimes tend to be
drafted with great care so as not to preclude the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by national courts in these type of cases. Thus, while there
may be no general rule specifically authorizing the right to exercise
universal jurisdiction, the absence of a prohibitive rule and the growing
international consensus on the need to punish crimes regarded as most
heinous by the international community, indicate that the warrant for the
arrest of Mr. Yerodia did not as such violate international law.
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal agree in general with the
Court's finding regarding Mr. Yerodia's immunity. They share the
Court's view that the immunity of a Foreign Minister must not be
equated with impunity and that procedural immunity cannot shield the
Minister from personal responsibility once the Minister is no longer in
office. However, they consider as too expansive the scope of the
immunities the Court attributes to Foreign Ministers and too restrictive
the limits it appears to impose on the scope of the personal responsibility
of such officials and where they may be tried. In their view, serious
crimes under international law engage the personal responsibility of high
State officials. For purposes of immunities, the concept of official acts
must be narrowly defined.
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Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal voted against the Court's
finding in paragraph (3) of the dispositif that Belgium must cancel the
arrest warrant. They consider that the Court's reliance on the dictum in
the Factory at ChorzUw case is misplaced because the restoration of the
status quo ante is not possible as Mr. Yerodia is no longer Foreign
Minister. Moreover, since Mr. Yerodia no longer holds this office, the
illegality attaching to the warrant ceased and with it the continuing
illegality that would justify an order for its withdrawal.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE REZEK

Judge Rezek voted in favour of all paragraphs of the operative part of the
Judgment. He nonetheless regrets that the Court did not rule on the issue
of the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts. The fact that the Congo confined
itself to inviting the Court to render a decision based on immunity does
not justify, in Judge Rezek's view, the Court's dropping of what
represents an inevitable logical premise to the examination of the issue of
immunity.
Judge Rezek considers that an examination of international law
demonstrates that, as it currently stands, that law does not permit the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by domestic courts in the absence of
some connecting circumstance with the forum State. A fortiori, it follows
that Belgium cannot be considered as having been "obliged" to institute
criminal proceedings in this case. Judge Rezek notes in particular that the
Geneva Conventions do not enshrine any notion of universal jurisdiction
in absentia, and that such jurisdiction has never been claimed by the
Spanish courts in the Pinochet case.
Judge Rezek concludes by noting the importance of restraint in the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by domestic courts; a restraint in line
with the notion of a decentralized international community, founded on
the principle of the equality of its members and necessarily requiring
mutual co-ordination.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AL-KHASAWNEH

Judge AI-Khasawneh dissented because, in his opmlOn, incumbent
Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy only limited immunity, i.e.,
immunity from enforcement when on an official mission. He arrived at
this conclusion on the bases that: immunity is an exception to the rule
that man is legally and morally responsible for his actions and should
therefore be construed narrowly; that unlike diplomats, the immunities of
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Foreign Ministers. are not clear in terms of their basis or extent and
unlike Heads of State, Foreign Ministers do not personify the State and
are therefore not entitled to immunities and privileges attaching to their
person. While the Belgian warrant went beyond jurisdiction, it contained
express language regarding unenforceability if the Minister was on
Belgian soil on official mission, similarly the circulation of the warrant
was not accompanied re while Mr. Yerodia was still in office re by a Red
Notice asking other States to take enforcement steps.
Judge AI-Khasawneh also dealt with the question of exceptions in the
case of high-ranking State officials accused of grave crimes from the
protection afforded by immunities. In this regard he felt that the morally
embarrassing problem of impunity was not adequately dealt with in the
Judgment which tried to circumvent the problem by an artificial
distinction between "procedural immunity" on the one hand and
"substantive immunity" on the other, and by postulating four situations
where immunity and impunity would not be synonymous, i.e., (a)
prosecution in the home State, (b) waiver and (c) prosecution after
leaving office, except for official acts and (d) before international courts.
Having considered these four situations he nevertheless felt that a lacuna
still existed. Lastly, he argued that the need for effective combating of
grave crimes - recognized as such by the international community represents a higher norm than the rules on immunity and in case of
conflict should prevail, even if one is to speak of reconciliation of
opposing norms and not of the triumph of one over the other, this would
suggest a more restrictive approach to immunity - which would
incidentally bring immunity from criminal process into consonance with
the now firmly established regime of restrictive immunities of States than the Judgment portrays.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE BULA-BuLA

By conducting itself unlawfully, the Kingdom of Belgium, a sovereign
State, committed an internationally wrongful act to the detriment of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, likewise a sovereign State.
Judge Bula-Bula fully supports the decision of the Court, which upholds
the rule of law against the law of the jungle. In this regard, he has also
indicated other grounds of fact and law which will render further
substance to a Judgment of interest to the entire international community.
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DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE V AN DEN WYNGAERT

Judge Van den Wyngaert has voted against the Court's decision on the
merits. She disagrees with the Court's conclusion that there is a rule of
customary international law granting immunity to incumbent Foreign
Ministers. She believes that Belgium has not violated a legal obligation it
owed in this respect to the Congo. Even assuming, arguendo, that there
was such a rule, there was no violation in the present case as the warrant
could not be and was not executed, neither in the country where it was
issued (Belgium) nor in the countries to which it was circulated: The
warrant was not an "international arrest warrant" in a legal sense: it could
and did not have this effect, neither in Belgium nor in third countries.
Judge Van den Wyngaert believes that these are the only objective
elements the Court should have looked at. The subjective elements, i.e.,
whether the warrant had a psychological effect on Mr. Yerodia or
whether it was perceived as offensive by the Congo (cf. the terms iniuria
and capitis diminutio used by counsel for the Congo) was irrelevant for
the dispute.
On the subject of immunities, Judge Van den Wyngaert finds no legal
basis under international law for granting immunity to an incumbent
Minister for Foreign Affairs. There is no conventional international law
on the subject. There is no customary international law on the subject
either. Before reaching the conclusion that Ministers for Foreign Affairs
enjoy a full immunity from foreign jurisdiction under customary
international law, the International Court of Justice should have satisfied
itself of the existence of State practice (usus) and opinio juris
establishing an international custom to this effect. A "negative" practice,
consisting in their abstaining from instituting criminal proceedings,
cannot, in itself, be seen as evidence for an opinio juris ("Lotus",
Judgment No.9, 1927, P.C.U., Series A, No. 10, p. 28), and abstinence
can be attributed to many other factors, including practical and political
considerations. Legal opinion does not support the Court's proposition
that Ministers for Foreign Affairs are immune from the jurisdiction of
other States under customary international law. Moreover, the Court
reaches this conclusion without regard to the general tendency toward the
restriction of immunity of the State officials (including even Heads of
State), not only in the field of private and commercial law but also in the
field of criminal law, when there are allegations of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Belgium may have acted contrary to
international comity, but it has not infringed international law. Judge Van
den Wyngaert therefore believes that the whole Judgment is based on
flawed reasoning.
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On the subject of (universal) jurisdiction, on which the Court did not
pronounce itself in the present Judgment, Judge Van den Wyngaert
believes that Belgium was perfectly entitled to apply its legislation to the
war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Mr.
Yerodia in the Congo. Belgium's War Crimes Act, giving effect to the
principle of universal jurisdiction regarding war crimes and crimes
against humanity, is not contrary to international law. On the contrary,
international law permits and even encourages States to assert this form
of jurisdiction in order to ensure that suspects of war crimes and crimes
against humanity do not find safe havens. Universal jurisdiction is not
contrary to the principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute for an
International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court will only
be able to act if States that have jurisdiction are unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out investigation or prosecution (Art. 17). And even
where such willingness exists, the International Criminal Court, like the
ad hoc international tribunals, will not be able to deal with all crimes that
come under its jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court will not
have the capacity for that, and there will always be a need for States to
investigate and prosecute core crimes. These States include, but are not
limited to, national and territorial States. Especially in the case of sham
trials, there will still be a need for third States to investigate and
prosecute.
This case was to be a test case, probably the first opportunity for the
International Court of Justice to address a number of questions that have
not been considered since the famous "Lotus" case of the Permanent
Court of International Justice in 1927. In technical terms, the dispute was
about an arrest warrant against an incumbent Foreign Minister. The
warrant was, however, based on charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, which the Court even fails to mention in the dispositif.
In a more principled way, the case was about how far States can or must
go when implementing modem international criminal law. It was about
the question what international law requires or allows States to do as
"agents" of the international community when they are confronted with
complaints of victims of such crimes, given the fact that international
criminal courts will not be able to judge all international crimes. It was
about balancing two divergent interests in modem international
(criminal) law: the need of international accountability for such crimes as
torture, terrorism, war crimes and crimes against humanity and the
principle of sovereign equality of States, which presupposes a system of
immunities.
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Judge Van den Wyngaert regrets that the Court has not addressed the
dispute from this perspective and has instead focused on the very narrow
technical question of immunities for incumbent Foreign Ministers. In
failing to address the dispute from a more principled perspective, the
International Court of Justice has missed an excellent opportunity to
contribute to the development of modem international criminal law. In
legal doctrine, there is a plethora of recent scholarly writings on the
subject. Major scholarly organizations and non-governmental
organizations have taken clear positions on the subject of international
accountability. The latter may be seen as the opinion of civil society, an
opinion that cannot be completely discounted in the formation of
customary international law today. She highly regrets that the Court fails
to acknowledge this development, and instead adopts a formalistic
reasoning, examining whether there is, under customary international
law, an international crimes exception to the re wrongly postulated re rule
of immunity for incumbent Ministers under customary international law.
By adopting this approach, the Court implicitly establishes a hierarchy
between the rules on immunity (protecting incumbent former Ministers)
and the rules on international accountability (calling for the investigation
of charges against incumbent Foreign Ministers suspected of war crimes
and crimes against humanity). By elevating the former rules to the level
of customary international law in the fIrst part of its reasoning, and
fInding that the latter have failed to reach the same status in the second
part of its reasoning, the Court does not need to give further
consideration to the legal status of the principle of international
accountability under international law. Other courts, for example, the
House of Lords in the Pinochet case and the European Court of Human
Rights in the AI-Adsani case have given more thought and consideration
to the balancing of the relative normative status of international ius
cogens crimes and immunities.
Judge Van den Wyngaert disagrees with the Court's proposition that
immunity does not lead to impunity of incumbent Foreign Ministers.
This may be true in theory, but not in practice. It is, in theory, true that an
incumbent or former Foreign Minister can always be prosecuted in his
own country or in other States if the State whom he represents waves
immunity, as the Court asserts. However, this is precisely the core of the
problem of impunity: where national authorities are not willing or able to
investigate or prosecute, the crime goes unpunished. And this is what
happened in the present case. The Congo accused Belgium of exercising
universal jurisdiction in absentia against an incumbent Foreign Minister,
but it had itself omitted to exercise its jurisdiction in presentia in the case
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of Mr. Yerodia, thus infringing the Geneva Conventions and not
complying with a host of United Nations resolutions to this effect. The
Congo did not come to the Court with clean hands: it blamed Belgium
for investigating and prosecuting allegations of international crimes that
it was obliged to investigate and prosecute itself.
In addition, Judge Van den Wyngaert finds the Judgment highly
unsatisfactory where it states that immunity does not lead to impunity of
former Foreign Ministers: according to the Court, the lifting of full
immunity, in this case, is only for acts committed prior or subsequent to
his or her period of office and for acts committed during that period of
office in a private capacity. Whether war crimes and crimes against
humanity fall into this category the Court does not say. Judge Van den
Wyngaert finds it extremely regrettable that the International Court of
Justice has not, like the House of Lords in the Pinochet case, qualified
this statement. It could and indeed should have added that war crimes
and crimes against humanity can never fall into this category. Some
crimes under international law (e.g., certain acts of genocide and of
aggression) can, for practical purposes, only be committed with the
means and mechanisms of a State and as part of a State policy. They
cannot, from that perspective, be anything other than "official" acts.
Immunity should never apply to crimes under international law, neither
before international courts nor national courts.
Victims of such violations bringing legal action against such persons in
third States would face the obstacle of immunity from jurisdiction.
Today, they may, by virtue of the application of the 1969 Special
Missions Convention, face the obstacle of immunity from execution
while the Minister is on an official visit, but they would not be barred
from bringing an action altogether. Judge Van den Wyngaert feels that
taking immunities further than this may even lead to conflict with
international human rights rules, particularly the right of access to court,
as appears from the recent Al-Adsani case of the European Court of
Human Rights.
According to Judge Van den Wyngaert, an implicit consideration behind
this Judgment may have been a concern for abuse and chaos, arising
from the risk of States asserting unbridled universal jurisdiction and
engaging in abusive. prosecutions against incumbent Foreign Ministers of
other States and thus paralysing the functioning of these States. In the
present dispute, however, there was no allegation of abuse of process on
the part of Belgium. Criminal proceedings against Mr. Yerodia were not
frivolous or abusive. The warrant was issued after two years of criminal
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investigations and there were no allegations that the investigating judge
who issued it acted on false factual evidence. The accusation that
Belgium applied its War Crimes Statute in an offensive and
discriminatory manner against a Congolese Foreign Minister was
manifestly ill-founded. Belgium, rightly or wrongly, wishes to act as an
agent of the world community by allowing complaints brought by·
foreign victims of serious human rights abuses committed abroad. Since
the infamous Dutroux case (a case of child molestation attracting great
media attention in the late 1990s), Belgium has amended its laws in order
to improve victims' procedural rights, without discriminating between
Belgian and foreign victims. In doing so, Belgium has also opened its
courts to victims bringing charges based on war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed abroad. This new legislation has been
applied, not only in the case against Mr. Yerodia but also in cases against
Mr. Pinochet, Mr. Sharon, Mr. Rafzanjani, Mr. Hissen HabrE, Mr. Fidel
Castro, etc. It would therefore be wrong to say that the War Crimes
Statute has been applied against a Congolese national in a discriminatory
way.
In the abstract, the chaos argument may be pertinent. This risk may exist,
and the Court could have legitimately warned against it in its Judgment
without necessarily reaching the conclusion that a rule of customary
international law exists to the effect of granting immunity to Foreign
Ministers. Judge Van den Wyngaert observes that granting immunities to
incumbent Foreign Ministers may open the door to other sorts of abuse.
It dramatically increases the number of persons that enjoy international
immunity from jurisdiction. Recognizing immunities for other members
of government is just one step further: in present-day society, all cabinet
members represent their countries in various meetings. If Foreign
Ministers need immunities to perform their functions, why not grant
immunities to other cabinet members as well? The International Court of
Justice does not state this, but doesn't this flow from its reasoning
leading to the conclusion that Foreign Ministers are immune? The
rationale for assimilating Foreign Ministers with diplomatic agents and
Heads of State, which is at the centre of the Court's reasoning, also exists
for other Ministers who represent the State officially, for example,
Ministers of Education who have to attend UNESCO conferences in New
York or other Ministers receiving honorary doctorates abroad. Male fide
governments may appoint persons to cabinet posts in order to shelter
them from prosecutions on charges of international crimes.
Judge Van den Wyngaert concludes by saying that the International
Court of Justice, in its effort to close one box of Pandora for fear of
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chaos and abuse, may have opened another one: that of granting
immunity and thus de facto impunity to an increasing number of
government officials.
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